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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Karen R. Hofmann, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs- No. 16265 
Elizabeth S. Sullivan, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal From the Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Christin~ M. Durham, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages arising from the breach of 
an agreement to convey real property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Plaintiff and Defendant both moved for summary judg-
ment in this matter. The lower court denied Plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment and granted Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the summary 
judgment granted in favor of Defendant and enter a judgment 
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in favor of Plaintiff in the sum of $9,450.00, or in the al-
ternative that the case be remanded to the trial court for 
the purpose of awarding damages to Plaintiff for breach of 
the agreement. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A different aspect of this case involving many of the 
same facts was before this Court recently in Case No. 15742 
involving the same parties. The case was argued before the 
Court on February 21, 1979. The prior and present appeal both 
center around the same lease agreement and in particular, para-
graphs 13. and 14. of that agreement which are as follows: 
"13. Upon expiration of this lease, the Lessee 
shall have first right of refusal in signing 
of a lease for this premises, and first right 
of refusal in acceptance of the sale of said 
premises. 
14. Upon expiration of this lease (or before 
if mutually agreed upon) the Lessee shall be 
able to apply one hundred dollars ($100.00) 
per month of the above agreed rental upon the 
sale price of the premises, set at this date 
as Forty nine thousand five hundred dollars 
($49,500.00). If. the Lessee does not wish 
to exercise this option, the full amount of 
monthly rental shall be reverted to rental 
only and considered as obligation to carry-
ing out terms of the lease." 
In the prior appeal, Appellant claimed that paragraph 
14. gave her an absolute option to buy the premises at the 
expiration of the lease for the price stated. The Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft presiding, denied Plaintiff's claim stating 
that paragraphs 13. and 14. must be read together and that 
the effect of the two paragraphs so combined was to give 
Appellant only a conditional option to purchase the premises 
if and when Respondent decided to sell. Appellant's prior 
appeal was therefore based in part on Judge Croft's interpre-
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tation of the document as stated, Appellant's position being 
that paragraphs 13. and 14. were separate and distinct. 
Appellant's second action resulting in the present appeal 
was brought for the reason that Respondent did in fact decide 
to sell the premises and did in fact sell the premises to a 
third party without first offering the premises to Appellant 
and without notifying the Appellant of the sale. The sale 
of the property to the third party was finalized on January 
13, 1978, ten days before judgment in the prior action was 
entered. The sale price to the third party was $57,750.00, 
cash. (Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of In-
terrogatories, No.'s 2., 3., and 6.) 
Appellant commenced the instant action after learning of 
the sale of the premises to a third party. Appellant and Re-
spondent both moved for summary judgment in the lower court. 
Appellant moving for summary judgment in the amount of $9,450.00 
or in the alternative for a summary judgment in Appellant's 
favor on the issue of liability only. Respondent brought her 
motion for summary judgment on the theory that Appellant's 
right to purchase the premises expired at the expiration of 
the lease, October 14, 1977. On December 28, 1978 the lower 
court filed a memorandum decision and the order denying Appel-
lant's motion for summary judgment and granting Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment was entered on January 9, 1979. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, RESPONDENT HAS BREACHED THE 
WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND APPELLANT 
IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT FOR THE RESULTING DAMAGES. 
The written agreement is attached to Plaintiff's Complaint 
and is also attached to Defendant's Affidavit Supporting Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The agreement provides for the lease to 
Appellant of a certain dwelling owned by Respondent. Pursuant 
to the lease provisions, Appellant entered into possession 
for the one year term ending on the 14th day of October, 1977. 
Appellant paid to Respondent the monthly rent provided in the 
agreement. (Affidavit of Hofmann, No. 3) 
The agreement provided in part the following: 
"13. Upon expiration of this lease, the Lessee 
shall have first right of refusal in signing 
of a lease for this premises, and first right 
of refusal in acceptance of the sale of said 
premises. 
14. Upon expiration of this lease (or before 
if mutually agreed upon) the Lessee shall be 
able to apply one hundred dollars ($100.00) 
per month of the above agreed rental upon the 
sale price of the premises, set at this date 
as Forty nine thousand five hundred dollars 
($49,500.00). If the Lessee does not wish to 
exercise this option, the full amount of monthly 
rental shall be reverted to rental only and con-
sidered as obligation to carrying out terms of 
the lease." 
On January 13, 1978, Respondent sold the subject property 
to a person other than Appellant for the cash price of $57.750.00, 
Appellant was given no notice of the intended sale nor was 
-s-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant offered an opportunity to be the purchaser at said 
sale. Appellant would have purchased the subject property had 
it been offered to her. (Affidavit of Hofmann, No. 5. and 6.) 
Appellant's claim that Respondent breached the agreement 
is based on Paragraph 13. of the agreement which grants a right of 
first refusal in acceptance of the sale of the premises upon 
expiration of the lease. The nature of a right of first re-
fusal was explained by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Russell v. Park City, Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889 (1976). Therein 
the Court stated at page 891: 
"We note awareness that what is often called 
'the right of refusal' is not the same as an 
option, wherein the optionee has a definite 
right to purchase, whereas, the right of re-
fusal has no effect until and unless the party 
granting it ••• decides to sell." 
A right of first refusal therefore continues until the event 
of sale. The granter of the right controls the length of time 
during which the right of first refusal continues by his de-
cision as to whether or not to sell. Since the right of the 
grantee to purchase arises only when the granter decides to 
sell, no date of expiration for the right need be stated or 
determined as in the case of an option where the optionee is 
granted an absolute right to purchase during a certain time 
period. 
In accord with the foregoing discussion is the case of 
Cummings v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912). The 
agreement therein provided for the sale of certain shares of 
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stock and in addition provided: 
" .• and also to give an option on all their 
or either of their interest in the estate of 
Julian Moses, deceased, or refusal to purchase 
the same at a price as low as any other bona 
fide offer for it or any portion of it ••• " 
The appellants in that case claimed that the agreement granted 
them the right to purchase the property when the respondents 
decided to sell. The appellants established at trial that 
the property had been sold approximately nine months after the 
above agreement was signed, and further established that the 
sale was made without the knowledge or consent of appellants. 
In response to the respondents' argument that the agreement was 
unfair because it contained no time limit, the Court made the 
following comments: 
"Counsel contend that it appears from the 
face of the agreement that it is unfair 
because it contains no limit of time within 
which the option should be exercised. This 
objection has no merit, because no time limit 
was necessary under the terms of the agreement. 
The option was to become effective only in 
case the Nielsons desired to sell their interest 
in the land mentioned in the agreement. If they 
did not wish to sell, they were not bound to do 
so; but, if they did intend to sell, then under 
the agreement they bound themselves for a valu-
able consideration expressed therein to give the 
appellants the option, or, as it is expressed 
in the agreement, 'refusal to purchase', the 
interest mentioned .•• " Cummings at 165 
In the instant case, the written agreement which was 
drafted by the Respondent provides that the Appellant's right 
of first refusal commences upon expiration of the lease, 
October 14, 1977. Respondent states in her affidavit dated 
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May 16, 1978, that she sold the subject property on January 
13, 1978 to a person other than Appellant. Appellant was 
given no notice whatsoever of the intended sale as stated in 
Appellant's affidavit. Respondent has therefore breached the 
agreement and Appellant is entitled to a judgment for the 
resulting damages as a matter of law. The Court in Cummings 
stated at page 165: 
"If the Nielsons desired to sell they were 
thus required to give Mr. and Mrs. Cummings 
an opportunity to purchase - that is, the 
refusal to purchase the interest in the lands. 
This is too plain for cavil, because by the 
term 'refusal to purchase' everybody knows 
what is meant, although the condition may not 
be fully expressed. What is meant thereby 
is that, if the owners of the interest in 
question desired to sell it, they must commu-
nicate that fact to the party holding the 
option to purchase, and thus give the latter 
an opportunity to purchase or to refuse to 
do so. If the latter refuses, he has fully 
exercised his option. If, however, he then 
expreses his willingness to purchase, the 
question of price arises." 
The matter of price and damages is addressed in the next 
point of argument. 
POINT II 
THE AGREEMENT OF PARTIES PROVIDES 
THAT APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO 
PURCHASE THE PROPERTY FOR THE 
SUM OF $48,300.00. 
As mentioned in the Statement of Facts, the written agree-
ment between the parties has been the subject of prior litiga-
tion and appeal to this Court. Paragraph 14. of the agreement 
refers to an option at the sale price of $49,500.00. The same 
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paragraph provides that the Lessee (Appellant) shall be able 
to apply $100.00 per month of the rental payments towards the 
sale price, resulting in the sale price of $48,300.00. 
In the prior action, Judge Croft found that paragraph 
14. did not grant Appellant an absolute option to buy the 
property at the price stated. Judge Croft's reasoning was as 
follows: 
"And you read paragraph 13 and paragraph 14 
together, and I do not find that it is a clear, 
unequivocal option to the plaintiff to buy at 
the end of the lease period should she elect to 
do so. Rather, I think that the rather clear 
intent is that if the defendant decides to sell 
at the end of the lease period, or before if the 
parties agree, you see, then the plaintiff would 
have the first right of refusal. And if she 
exercised the right to buy upon the defendant 
deciding to sell then under paragraph 14 a 
hundred dollars a month of her monthly rentals 
would be applied to the purchase price." 
(Tr. motion for new trial, p. 14 ln. 20-29, 
presently part of record in Supreme Court No. 
15742) 
"If the plaintiff exercised her right to 
buy, exercised her first right of refusal 
by deciding to buy, then under paragraph 
14, I don't think there is any question 
that she would be able to apply $1,200.00 
of the rental paid to the purchase price set 
out in that paragraph." (Tr. plaintiff's 
motion for new trial, p. 15, ln. 10-15, 
presently part of record Supreme Court No. 
15742) 
Judge Croft's position is that because paragraph 13. which 
grants a right of first refusal precedes paragraph 14. granting 
the option at a fixed price, the combined effect is to give 
Appellant the right to purchase upon the stated price in 
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paragraph 14. only in the event Respondent decides to sell. 
Since the Respondent did subsequently did decide to sell, 
Appellant should therefore have been allowed to purchase at 
the price of $48,300.00. If this were not the case, paragraph 
14. would have no application whatsoever in the agreement. If 
Appellant cannot demand to purchase the property at the stated 
price upon the expiration of the lease as she attempted to do 
with the assistance of the courts in the prior action, and if 
Appellant is not allowed to have the benefit of the stated 
price now that Respondent has decided to sell the property, 
then Appellant's rights under the agreement are merely a 
fiction. 
It should be noted that Appellant's status in the negoti-
ation of this agreement was that of tenant and Respondent's 
status was that of landlord. It was established without dis-
pute in the prior action and in this action by way of Appellant's 
affidavit that Respondent was entirely responsible for the 
drafting and preparation of this agreement and that the Appellant 
as a tenant was merely presented with the agreement for signa-
ture. As this Court has observed in Bonneville on the Hill Co. 
v. Howard N. Sloane, 572 P.2d 402, 403 (Utah 1977): 
nin view of the dispute which has arisen, the 
meaning of that covenant quoted above should 
be determined from the language of the lease, 
and the circumstances in which it was used, 
as manifesting the intent of the parties. In 
that connection, a foundational rule is that 
if there is any doubt or uncertainty in the 
language, it should be strictly construed 
against the plaintiff landlord, who furnished 
the lease and required the tenant to sign." Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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There is no equity in the proposition that a landlord can 
draft a lease and therein dangle the opportunity to purchase 
the leased premises at a stated price before the eyes of the 
tenant and then after receiving the consideration of rental 
payments during the lease period, snatch away the tenant's 
benefit of the bargain which only matures when the lease 
period expires. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES IN THE 
SUM OF $9,450.00, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
A NEW TRIAL TO DETERMINE DAMAGES. 
It is the well settled rule in Utah that the measure of 
damages for failure to convey real property is the difference 
between the market value of the property at the time of breach 
and the purchase price agreed upon. In accordance with the 
foregoing discussion, Appellant should have been allowed to 
purchase the property for the agreed price of $48,300.00. 
The Respondent states in her Answers to Interrogatories that 
the property was advertised in the newspaper and that the 
property was sold for the cash price of $57,750.00. For the 
purposes of this appeal, Appellant does not dispute the sum 
of $57,750.00 as the market value of the property. No other 
evidence of market value was offered in this action alghough 
the Respondent testified at the trial in the prior action that 
she recently obtained an appraisal for $58,500.00. (Tr. p. 43, 
ln. 18-23) Assuming that the price at which the property was 
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actually sold is in fact market value, Appellant's damages 
are fixed at $9,450.00. In the alternative, Appellant re-
quests this Court remand this matter to the lower court for 
the purpose of awarding damages. This relief is consistent 
with Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the lower 
court where it was moved in the alternative for summary judg-
ment as to liability only with the matter of damages being 
reserved for trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court below conunitted reversible error by finding 
that Appellant's right to purchase the property was extin-
guished at that exact point in time when the lease expired. 
According to the express words of the agreement, Appellant's 
right came into existence only upon expiration of the lease 
and if that right expired at the same time it did not exist 
for any practical purpose. The correct view of a first re-
fusal right was pronounced by this Court in the Cununings case 
where it was held that such a right continues until the granters 
decision to sell at which time the granter must first of fer 
the sale to the holder of that right. If a right of refusal 
were held to exist only at the instant in time at which it 
were granted, the granto~ would simply delay his decision to 
sell and escape any duty to the holder of the right who has 
paid a consideration therefore. 
According to the view expressed by Judge Croft, at the 
time of Respondent's decision to sell, Appellant should have 
been offered the opportunity to purchase the property at 
$48,300.00. Respondents sale to a third party for the sum 
of $57,750.00 denied Appellant the benefit of her bargain in 
the amount of $9,450.00 which Appellant is entitled to judg-
ment therefore. In the alternative, Appellant requests that 
this case be remanded to the lower court for determination 
of damages. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERTS, BLACK & DIBBLEE 
I I 
By JAMES R. SOPER 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that I caused to be delivered two copies of 
the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to Carol Brockbank Olson, 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, Twelfth Floor, Continental 
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this J.:l!!l_ day of 
April, 1979. 
bt 
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